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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43757 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-9625 
      ) 
MICHAEL DUANE AGE,   ) APPELLANT'S 
      ) REPLY BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
 ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Michael Age appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed his sentence in this case because the statements it made reveal it did not 
appreciate the full scope of its discretion.  The district court’s given reason for imposing 
sentence was clearly erroneous and improperly focused on Mr. Age’s criminal history 
rather than the facts of the instant offense. 
 The State’s responses on each of these points are mistaken because its 
arguments do not address the actual statements made by the district court.  Rather, the 
State tries to read a purportedly-proper intent into the district court’s statements.  When 
the district court’s actual statements are reviewed, the abuse of the district court’s 
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discretion in imposing a unified sentence of five years, all fixed, on the facts of this case 
is evident.  Therefore, this Court should grant the requested relief. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Age’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed Mr. Age’s 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Age’s 
Sentence, Especially By Making The Entire Sentence Fixed Time 
 
 
A. The District Court Failed To Recognize The Full Scope Of Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
The district court’s actual statement – “And I’m going to impose a five-year fixed 
sentence.  There will be no indeterminate time.  I don’t have the ability to protect the 
community for as long of a term.  We don’t have the ability to supervise Mr. Age on 
parole.  But that’s the best that I can do,” (Tr., p.49, Ls.6-12) – reveals that the district 
court miscomprehended the scope of its discretion in sentencing Mr. Age.  There was 
no mandatory minimum sentence for the crime to which Mr. Age had pleaded guilty 
(aggravated assault).  See I.C. 18-906.  Thus, the statement, “that’s the best that I can 
do,” demonstrates that the district court failed to appreciate that it did, in fact, have the 
discretion to make some of the five-year period indeterminate.  See I.C. § 19-2513.  
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 The State contends what the district court was trying to say was “it could not 
impose any indeterminate time in addition to the fixed five-year term it deemed 
appropriate.”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)  That argument is improper, as it skips a step in the 
analysis, and in doing so, ignores what the district court actually said.  As the Court of 
Appeals recently explained, to properly exercise its discretion, the district court must 
first appreciate the entire scope of its discretion; only then can it adequately determine 
what the best course of action within that discretion is.   State v. Harer, ___ P.3d ___, 
2016 WL 1163485, **3-4 (Ct. App. March 25, 2016).   
In Harer, the Court of Appeals was reviewing the district court’s denial of the 
State’s request for restitution for the time the prosecutor worked on that case.  Id.  The 
district court determined the State had failed to show an economic loss.  Id.  The Court 
of Appeals held that determination failed to recognize the possibility that the district 
court could, pursuant to statute, award the requested restitution in the first place.  Harer, 
2016 WL 1163485 at **3-4.  As a result, the Court of Appeals held, “the district court 
could not exercise its discretion as to the award without first recognizing the 
prosecutor’s general salary for time spent on this case as an economic loss for which 
restitution may be requested.”  Id. at *4.  Thus, the Harer Court summarized the relevant 
rule:  “That is not to say that because an economic loss has been established that it 
must be awarded.  However, the trial court must first recognize the economic loss 
before it can exercise its discretion as to whether or how much to award.”  Id.  
As a result of that rule, the Court of Appeals did not decide the point Mr. Harer 
argued on appeal – that the district court’s statements represented a consideration of 
the appropriate factors, and so, the decision was proper and within the district court’s 
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discretion.  Id. at *4 n.3.  Rather, it remanded the case so the district court could 
consider those factors within the proper scope of its discretion.  See id. 
Like Mr. Harer, the State in this case is arguing that the district court’s statements 
represented a consideration of the appropriate factors, and so, reached an appropriate 
decision within its discretion.  (See Resp. Br., pp.3-4.)  This Court should refuse to 
consider the State’s argument for the same reason the Harer Court refused to address 
such an argument:  since the district court did not appreciate the full scope of its 
discretion, those arguments are more appropriately considered on remand.   
In fact, the analysis from Harer, though discussing a restitution decision and not 
a sentencing decision, grafts neatly onto this whole issue:  the argument on appeal is 
not to say that, because an indeterminate sentence could be imposed, it must be 
imposed.  As noted in I.C. § 19-2513, the district court has discretion over whether, and 
how long, to order a sentence to be indeterminate.  However, the district court could not 
exercise its discretion as to the sentence without first recognizing an indeterminate term 
was a term which could be imposed in this case.  Cf. Harer, 2016 WL 1163485, *4.  
Since the district court’s actual statements – “We don’t have the ability to supervise 
Mr. Age on parole.  But that’s the best I can do.” (Tr., p.49, Ls.10-12) – do not take the 
possibility of an indeterminate sentence into account, the district court acted without 
recognizing the full scope of its discretion.  As such, the district court abused its 
discretion when it imposed Mr. Age’s sentence. 
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B. The District Court Erroneously Concluded That Mr. Age Could Not Be 
Supervised On Parole 
 
The district court’s finding of fact – “We don’t have the ability to supervise 
Mr. Age on parole,” (Tr., p.49, Ls.10-11) – is clearly erroneous as it is directly 
contradicted by various facts in the record.  (See App. Br., pp.7-8.)  Therefore, the 
district court’s decision to order Mr. Age’s entire sentence be fixed as a result of that 
conclusion constitutes an abuse of its discretion.   
The State responds that the district court’s comment “accurately reflected the 
court’s sentencing options in light of its determination that a fixed five-year term was 
warranted since five years is the maximum sentence authorized for aggravated assault.”  
(Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)  As with the “best I can do” statement discussed in Section A, supra, 
the State again ignores the actual statements the district court made as it tries to read 
some appropriate intent into the district court’s statements.  That argument is 
inappropriate since the analysis properly starts “from the premise that the . . . court 
meant what it said.”  State v. Juarez, 159 Idaho 91, 95 (2015) (explaining why the 
magistrate court’s framing of the proceedings in that case as misdemeanor contempt 
proceedings rather than contempt proceedings under the juvenile corrections act helped 
reveal why that court had not been divested of jurisdiction due to the defendant turning 
eighteen).   
Along those lines, the Court of Appeals has vacated a sentencing order in a 
similar situation.  Noel v. State, 113 Idaho 92, 96-97 (Ct. App. 1987).  The Noel Court 
explained that the statements the district court actually made in that case indicated it 
was operating under the mistaken belief that there was a mandatory minimum sentence 
it had to impose on the defendant.  Id.  “Based on this record we can only conclude that 
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the sentence pronounced may be illegal.  At least the record of the sentencing is 
ambiguous in that it suggests the sentence may have been dedicated by an inapplicable 
statute.  The sentence must be vacated.”  Id.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
proceeded to reverse the order denying the defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief 
and remanded the case with instructions to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea 
because, based on the problems with the sentence, the Court found a lack of notice 
which rendered the defendant’s guilty plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Id. 
When looking at what the district court actually said in Mr. Age’s case, the same 
underlying concern in Noel is present here:  the district court was operating under the 
clearly erroneous understanding of its ability to make a portion of the sentence 
indeterminate.  See also, e.g., State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 273 (2013) (reiterating 
that whether or not a defendant could and should actually be granted the opportunity of 
parole under an indeterminate sentence is a decision left to the discretion of the parole 
board).  Therefore, like in Noel, the sentence should be vacated based on what the 
district court actually said.  The State’s arguments attempting to divine a justification for 
the district court’s decision despite its actual, problematic statements are improper.  
Reviewing the statements the district court actually made, it abused its discretion by 
basing the all-fixed sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.   
 
C. The District Court Improperly Focused On Mr. Age’s Prior Offenses Rather Than 
The Facts Surrounding The Instant Offense When It Imposed His Sentence 
 
The district court also abused its discretion by departing from the unanimous 
recommendation for probation from the prosecutor, the PSI author, and defense 
counsel, a recommendation based on Mr. Age’s current actions and character.  The 
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district court did not follow that recommendation because it focused on his criminal 
history rather than his current character and actions.  (See Tr., p.45, L.4 - p.47, L.12.)  
Certainly, the court may take a defendant’s criminal history into account, but that cannot 
be the primary focus of the decision because the district court’s job is to sentence the 
defendant for the crime before it.  State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
The State contends Findeisen does not lead to the conclusion that the district 
court abused its discretion in this case because that decision reaffirms that the district 
court may consider the defendant’s criminal history within the spectrum of evidence 
bearing on the defendant’s character at sentencing.  (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)  However, 
the State’s argument, which only focuses on the first part of the Findeisen analysis, 
misses the critical point.  It is under the second part of the Findeisen analysis, not the 
first, where the abuse of the district court’s discretion lurks:  “sentence must be 
rendered with the recognition that [the defendant] has already been sentenced for those 
related offenses, and the court’s focus at resentencing must be on determination of the 
appropriate sentence for the [offense] that is before the court.”1  Id. (emphasis added).   
The second part of the Findeisen analysis makes sense in the context of 
                                            
1 The Findeisen Court did posit that the trial court might be more justified in focusing on 
prior criminal behavior “if they were acts for which the defendant was not otherwise 
being punished.  But in this case, the defendant had already been sentenced 
specifically for those offenses . . . .”  Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 230.  Not only had Mr. Age 
already been sentenced for the offenses on which the district court was focusing, he 
had satisfied those sentences.  (See, e.g., PSI, pp.4-6, 10, 15.)  As such, the district 
court’s focus on those prior offenses remained improper. 
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Mr. Age’s case because of the axiomatic principle that people can change over time.2  
Thus, a criminal history becomes less relevant for predicting future behavior the further 
in the past it is, particularly when, as here, there are no new charges in the interim.  
Cf. I.C. § 19-2521(2)(g).  And yet, that is exactly the justification the State is trying to 
read into the district court’s statements.  (See Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)  As in Findeisen, 
Mr. Age had already been punished for the offenses which were the district court’s 
focus at sentencing.  (See, e.g., PSI, pp.4-5.)  Thus, the State’s attempt to read the 
district court’s statements as a proper consideration of a relevant factor again ignores 
what the district court actually said, as well as the other relevant facts in this case.  The 
district court’s actual statements show its primary focus was on offenses for which 
Mr. Age had been sentenced at least eight years before, rather than the facts of the 
case pending before it, in its sentencing decision.  That constitutes an abuse of the 
district court’s discretion.   
Finally, the State implies that holding the district court to its duty to act with and 
within an accurate understanding of its discretion when imposing a sentence will 
somehow chill district courts from explaining their sentencing analysis in future cases.  
(Resp. Br., p.9 (“To encourage district judges to articulate the reasons for the imposition 
of a particular sentence, this Court should discourage claims like those made by Age . . 
. .”) (internal quotation and brackets omitted).)  The arguments Mr. Age has raised here, 
based on the actual statements the district court made and appreciating the context in 
                                            
2 In Findeisen, the two sentencing hearings occurred on the same day, not years apart.  
Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229.  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals still vacated the 
sentence which was primarily focused on the other offenses rather than the one before 
the district court.  Id. at 230. 
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which they were made, risks no more a chilling effect than did the decisions in 
Findeisen and Noel, nor does it risk more than the recent decision in Harer.   
All three of those decisions acknowledge that, when the district court 
misunderstands its discretion or acts outside of the scope of that discretion, that mistake 
should be corrected.  Nevertheless, as Harer itself demonstrates, such decisions have 
not resulted in district courts subsequently refusing to articulate the bases for their 
discretionary decisions.  See Harer, 2016 WL 1163485, *3 (discussing the district 
court’s explanation of its decision).   Therefore, reaching a similar result in this case is 
unlikely to discourage district courts either.  
At any rate, such concerns do not justify allowing the district court’s imposition of 
an excessive sentence, entered without appreciating the full scope of its discretion and 
based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, to stand.  As such, this Court should 
disregard the State’s assertion and evaluate the district court’s decisions under the 
analysis set forth in precedent.  Since doing so reveals abuses of the district court’s 
discretion, this Court should correct those errors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Age respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 7th day of June, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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